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Roberts v. Burlington Industries-Workers' Compensation
for the Death of a Good Samaritan
For a death to be compensable under North Carolina's Workers' Compen-
sation Act, I the deceased employee must" have died as a result of an "accident
arising out of and in the course of [his] employment."' 2 In Roberts v. Burlington
Industries, Inc.3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed for the first
time the issue whether these requirements can be satisfied when an employee is
killed while attempting to render emergency assistance to a complete stranger.
In its decision, reversing the denial of the claim by the North Carolina Industrial
Commission, the court held that a death occurring in such an emergency rescue
situation can qualify for coverage under the Act.
4
This Note analyzes the court of appeals' decision in Roberts and concludes
that the decision, although morally satisfying, is legally unsound. As will be
discussed below, the Roberts court put forth several theories to support a finding
of coverage. None of these theories, however, was sufficient to allow compensa-
tion. In actuality, the court based its decision on unfounded notions of desirable
public policy, thereby awarding compensation for a death the North Carolina
General Assembly did not intend the workers' compensation system to bear.
The facts of Roberts are quite tragic. On a rainy night in November 1982,
Timothy Lee Roberts, a young furniture designer employed by Burlington In-
dustries, was driving home from the airport following a day-long business trip.
5
At approximately the same time, local law enforcement officials were removing
William Desmond Winters, Jr., a transient from Smithfield, Tennessee, from a
Howard Johnson's restaurant for failure to pay for his meal. 6 Almost immedi-
ately thereafter, a car struck and killed Winters as he was walking down the
interstate entrance ramp adjacent to the restaurant.7 Roberts was at this time
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1985).
2. Id. §§ 97-2(10), (6).
3. 86 N.C. App. 126, 356 S.E.2d 794 (1987). The author of this Note was employed as a
summer associate for the law firm representing Burlington Industries in Roberts v. Burlington Indus-
tries, Ina, but was not involved in any aspect of the case.
4. Id. at 136, 356 S.E.2d at 800.
5. Id. at 127, 356 S.E.2d at 795. Although Roberts and the other Burlington Industries em-
ployees on the trip arrived back at the airport at about 5:30 p.m., Roberts was not injured until
approximately 7:30 p.m. His whereabouts during the interim are uncertain. On the date of the
accident certain lines of Burlington Industries furniture were on display at the J.C. Penney's Furni-
ture Showroom in a nearby shopping mall; therefore the Industrial Commission determined that it
was possible that Roberts had spent this time examining furniture there, or possibly at another
furniture showroom. Id. at 129-30, 356 S.E.2d at 797. Because Roberts had resumed the normal
route to his home from the airport at the time he was killed, the court found that how he spent the
missing time was not relevant in determining whether workers' compensation benefits should be
awarded. Id.; see infra note 11.
6. Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at 127-28, 356 S.E.2d at 795. As he was leaving the restaurant,
Winters stated that he intended to lie down on the interstate entrance ramp adjacent to the restau-
rant so that he would be arrested and have a warm place to spend the night. Record at 9, Roberts
(No. 86101C 160) (counsels' stipulation of facts).
7. Id. The stipulated facts indicated that Winters' body came to rest approximately 126 feet
from the point of impact, in the paved and traveled portion of the ramp. Record at 9, Roberts (No.
8610IC1 160) (counsels' stipulation of facts).
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driving down that same ramp. When he saw Winters had been injured, Roberts
stopped to offer his assistance.8 As he was attempting to wave traffic around
Winters' body, Roberts was struck by two cars and killed.9
Deputy Commissioner Shuping of the North Carolina Industrial Commis-
sion initially heard the claim for workers' compensation death benefits on behalf
of Roberts' wife and young daughter.10 The Deputy Commissioner determined
that although Roberts' death occurred in the course of his employment,"1 the
death did not arise out of the employment;1 2 therefore, he denied compensa-
tion. 13 The full Commission later adopted the position of the Deputy
Commissioner. 14
Plaintiffs appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which reversed
the Industrial Commission's ruling.1 5 The court used three different tests to
support its finding that Roberts' death arose out of his employment. First, the
court applied the employer-benefit test, determining that Roberts' death arose
out of his employment because his acts benefited Burlington Industries by in-
creasing the employer's goodwill.1 6 Second, the court applied the positional-risk
test, concluding that Roberts' death arose out of his employment because the
employment brought Roberts to the position where he encountered a stranger in
need of assistance and was subsequently killed.1 7 Last, the court applied the
increased-risk test and determined that the risk Roberts encountered was not a
risk that was common to the public. 18 In addition to these three tests, the court
supported its decision on the underlying policy reason that such humanitarian
8. Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at 128, 356 S.E.2d at 795. Roberts was actually the second "Good
Samaritan" on the scene. Another person, David Smith, had already stopped to aid Winters. Upon
stopping his car, Roberts asked Smith if the authorities had been called. Roberts stated that he had
seen law enforcement officials at the Howard Johnson's Restaurant and that he would go to contact
them. Roberts returned to the scene within five to eight minutes. By the time Roberts was actually
struck, a third man, James Cook, was also on the scene. Id.
9. Id.
10. Chapter 97, sections 38 and 39 of the North Carolina General Statutes govern the award of
workers' compensation death benefits to the dependents of the deceased employee. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-38 to -39 (1985).
11. In North Carolina if an employee's work requires him to travel, he is held to be "within the
course of" his employment during the entire trip, except when a distinct departure or deviation is
shown. Clark v. Burton Lines, 272 N.C. 433, 438, 158 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1968). Therefore, because
the accident resulting in Roberts' death occurred while Roberts was on his way home from the
airport following a business trip it was "in the course of" his employment. Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at
131, 356 S.E.2d at 797. Satisfaction of this requirement was not an issue on appeal. Id.
12. The Deputy Commissioner found that "Mr. Roberts' untimely death did not arise out of his
employment, but instead arose from the voluntary, albeit indisputably commendable, humanitarian
act of a good citizen and 'good Samaritan'...." Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at 130, 356 S.E.2d at 797.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 136, 356 S.E.2d at 800-01. On appeal from the Industrial Commission, the court was
limited to two questions: (1) whether evidence was sufficient to support the findings of fact; and
(2) whether the findings of fact justified the decision. Id. at 129, 356 S.E.2d at 796. The court of
appeals determined that the full Commission "erred by concluding as a matter of law that Mr.
Roberts' injury did not arise out of his employment." Id. at 131, 356 S.E.2d at 797.
16. Id. at 133, 356 S.E.2d at 798-99.
17. Id. at 134, 356 S.E.2d at 799.
18. Id. at 136, 356 S.E.2d at 800.
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acts should be encouraged. 19
A brief examination of the requirements for a recovery under the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, and of the tests that have been used to
address these requirements, is helpful in analyzing the court's decision in Rob-
erts. The dual requirements for a recovery in North Carolina, as well as in forty-
one other states, are that the accident both occur "during the course of" the
employment and "arise out of" the employment.20
The "in the course of" requirement is generally interpreted to refer to the
time, place, and circumstances of the accident.2 1 In reference to the task of
determining whether a particular injury satisfies this requirement, one commen-
tator has stated that the "court-made law [dealing with the 'in the course of'
requirement] has filled out to the point that it might be possible to make fairly
dependable predictions on coverage under almost any given set of facts involving
the time and place of the accident or the activity of the worker when he was
injured."' 22 An example in which the injury clearly satisfies the "in the course
of" requirement is when the accident resulting in the injury occurs on the em-
ployer's premises, during the employee's normal working hours, while the em-
ployee is engaged in his normal employment activity.
The second of the dual requirements, the "arising out of requirement," is
generally interpreted to refer to the origin or cause of the injury.23 The purpose
of this requirement is to ensure that "the risk that brought about the accident be
related in some way to the nature of the employment." 24 One comentator has
observed that "[i]f the cost of employee injuries is to be absorbed ultimately by
consumers, it is essential as a matter of policy for workmen's compensation to
exclude from coverage all accident risks that do not result from engaging in the
19. Id.
20. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.10, at 3-1 (1966). The
North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that "the concepts of 'arising out of' and 'in the course of'
employment are distinct elements, both of which must be established before compensation may be
allowed." Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 251, 293 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1982).
Although North Carolina courts continue to adhere to the dual requirements, they have adopted a
boot-strapping technique that makes it easier for the injured worker to satisfy the requirements.
Specifically, the North Carolina Supreme Court has described the "arising out of" and "in the
course of" requirements as "parts of a single test of work-connection" so that "deficiencies in the
strength of one factor are sometimes allowed to be made up by strengths in the other." Watkins v.
City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 281, 225 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1976).
21. Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531-32 (1977); Wilson v.
Town of Mooresville, 222 N.C. 283, 285, 22 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1942); Schmoyer v. Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints, 81 N.C. App. 140, 142, 343 S.E.2d 551, 552 (1986); Warren v. City of
Wilmington, 43 N.C. App. 748, 750, 259 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1979); Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448,
455, 162 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1968).
22. Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-The Dual Requirement
Reappraised, 51 N.C.L. Rnv. 705, 711 (1973). Courts have formulated special rules that apply to
common fact situations. For example, the "special errand" rule and the "dual purpose" doctrine are
two such rules used by the North Carolina courts to determine whether an injury arises out of the
employment. See Felton v. Hospital Guild of Thomasville, 57 N.C. App. 33, 291 S.E.2d 158, aff'd
without precedential value, 307 N.C. 121, 296 S.E.2d 297 (1982).
23. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 238, 188 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1972); Wilson v. Town of
Morresville, 222 N.C. 283, 285, 22 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1942); Schmoyer v. Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints, 81 N.C. App. 140, 142, 343 S.E.2d 551, 552 (1986).
24. Malone, supra note 22, at 711.
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productive process or that are not enhanced by that process in some determina-
ble way."'25
Although the "in the course of" requirement is well-defined, the "arising
out of" requirement remains quite nebulous. It is clear, however, that risks
distinctly associated with the employment, such as "machinery breaking, objects
falling, explosives exploding, tractors tipping, fingers getting caught in gears,
[and] excavations caving in" satisfy the "arising out of" requirement in all juris-
dictions.26 In other cases which are not so clear cut, a number of different tests
are used to determine whether an injury arises out of the employment. The
three tests applied by the Roberts court were the increased-risk test, the em-
ployer-benefit test, and the positional-risk test.27
The first test applied by the Roberts court was the increased-risk test. The
increased-risk test has long been used in North Carolina to determine whether
an injury "arises out of" the employment.28 For an injury to "arise out of" the
employment under this test, "some risk inherent to the employment must be a
contributing cause of the injury, and the risk must be one to which the general
public would not have been equally exposed apart from the employment. In
other words, the employment must have increased the risk of such injury
occurring."'29
The second test used by the Roberts court in its determination that Roberts'
death arose out of his employment was the employer-benefit test.3 0 Under this
test, "an injury arises out of the employment when it occurs while the employee
is engaged in some activity that he is authorized to undertake and that benefits,
directly or indirectly, the employer's business." 31 In applying this test, courts
look to "whether the employee acts for the benefit of his employer to any appre-
ciable extent or whether the employee acts solely for his own benefit or purpose
25. Malone, supra note 22, at 705. The author further illustrated the utility of the "arising out
of" requirement as follows:
The fact that the injury befell the worker while he was "on the job" would not be sufficient
in itself to warrant an award of compensation. For example, one might trip and fall any-
where. Is the fact that a worker trips on the threshold of his place of employment sufficient
justification for transferring his accident costs to those who ultimately buy his employer's
goods, while the cost of a similar mishap occurring at the worker's own door is to be
supported by the worker himself, by charity, or by public assistance?
Malone, supra note 22, at 711-12.
26. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 7.10, at 3-12.
27. According to Professor Larson, the currently used interpretations of the "arising out of"
requirement can be divided into three categories: the actual-risk test, the positional-risk test, and the
increased-risk test. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, §§ 6.10, 6.30 -.50, at 3-1 to -6. The test used by the
majority of jurisdictions is the increased-risk test. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, §§ 6.10, 6.30 -.50, at
3-1 to -6.
28. See Cole v. Guilford County, 259 N.C. 724, 727, 131 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1963); Sandy v.
Stackhouse, Inc., 258 N.C. 194, 198, 128 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1962); Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448,
455, 162 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1968).
29. Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at 131, 356 S.E.2d at 798 (citations omitted) (citing Guest v. Brenner
Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 454, 85 S.E.2d 596, 600-01 (1955); Pittman v. Twin City Laundry
& Cleaners, 61 N.C. App. 468, 472, 300 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1983)).
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing Long v. Asphalt Paving Co., 47 N.C. App. 564, 566, 268 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1980)).
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or that of a third person."'3 2
The third test applied by the Roberts court was the positional-risk test.
Other state courts have applied this test to determine whether benefits should be
awarded in emergency rescue cases. 33 Under this test, "[ain injury arises out of
the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions
and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he was
injured."'34 The degree of work-relatedness required by this test is much less
than that required under the increased-risk or employer-benefit tests because it
allows recovery when the "only connection of the employment with the injury is
that its obligations placed the employee in the particular place at the particular
time when he was injured by some neutral force."' 35 A "neutral" force is a force
that is "neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the
employment." '36
The primary significance of the Roberts decision is the court of appeals'
adoption of the positional-risk test. Although other state courts have applied this
test, Roberts is only the second North Carolina case to do so. More importantly,
the first North Carolina case to apply this test, Felton v. Hospital Guild of Thom-
asville,37 has no precedential value as it was affirmed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court on a three-three split.3 8 Because the degree of work-connection
required under the positional-risk test is much less than under the other tests
used by North Carolina courts to address the "arising out of" issue, the adop-
tion of this test represents a major shift from past decisions.
Although the application of the positional-risk test is new for North Caro-
lina courts, other jurisdictions have applied it to award compensation in emer-
gency rescue cases. 39 In the landmark case on this issue, O'Leary v. Brown-
32. Guest v. Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 452, 85 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1955).
33. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 6.50, at 3-6; see, ag., Food Products Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 129 Ariz. 208, 210-11, 630 P.2d 31, 34 (1981); In re D'Angeli's Case, 369 Mass. 812, 817-
18, 343 N.E.2d 368, 371 (1976). According to Professor Larson, "An important and growing
number of courts are accepting the full implications of the positional-risk test." 1 A. LARSON, supra
note 20, § 6.50, at 3-6.
34. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 6.50, at 3-6.
35. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 6.50, at 3-6.
36. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 6.50, at 3-6.
37. 57 N.C. App. 33, 291 S.E.2d 158, aff'd withoutprecedential value, 307 N.C. 121,296 S.E.2d
297 (1982).
38. Felton v. Hospital Guild of Thomasville, 307 N.C. 121, 121-22, 296 S.E.2d 297, 297 (1982).
Plaintiff in Felton, as part of her employment, was required to pick up items from a local bakery on
her way to work. She was injured when she slipped and fell on ice in her driveway while getting in
her car to go to the bakery. In a law review note analyzing Felton soon after it was decided, the
commentator stated:
The most troublesome aspect of Felton ... is the court's interpretation of the "arising out
of employment" requirement.... In Felton, plaintiff's injury was not the result of a risk
peculiar to her employment. As Judge Whichard observed in dissent, plaintiff's injury was
the result of a hazard encountered by everyone venturing outdoors on the morning in
question, whether or not they were employed by defendant.
Note, Worker's Compensation, 61 N.C.L. REv. 1243, 1247-48 (1983).
39. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 507 (1951); Food Products Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ariz. 208, 210-11, 630 P.2d 31, 34 (1981); In re D'Angeli's Case, 369 Mass.
812, 817-18, 343 N.E.2d 368, 371 (1976); Big "2" Engine Rebuilders v. Freeman, 379 So. 2d 888,
890 (Miss. 1980).
1988]
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Pacific-Maxon, Inc.,4° the United States Supreme Court awarded compensation
under the Longshoremen's Workers' Compensation Act to the dependents of an
employee who drowned in an attempt to rescue a complete stranger from a dan-
gerous channel located adjacent to an employee-maintained recreation facility.41
In support of its award of compensation, the Court stated:
[T]he test of recovery is not a causal relation between the nature of
employment of the injured person and the accident. Nor is it necessary
that the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of
benefit to his employer. All that is required is that the "obligations or
conditions" of employment created the "zone of special danger" out of
which the injury arose. 42
In light of this standard, the result in O'Leary seems justified. The standard
enunciated by the O'Leary Court, however, is not the standard employed by the
North Carolina courts. Unlike the Court in O'Leary, the Roberts court did not
dispense with the requirement of either an employer benefit or a causal connec-
tion between the employment and the injury. It is entirely inconsistent that the
Roberts court could follow the decision in O'Leary, an extreme application of the
positional-risk test, while still stating that in North Carolina "[tihere must be
some causal connection between the employment and the injury,"'43 or that the
injury must occur while the employee is engaged in some activity that benefits
the employer.44
In addition to being inconsistent with the O'Leary decision, the facts of
Roberts are distinguishable from those of the state court cases cited by the Rob-
erts court in support of its contention that the positional-risk test should be ap-
plied in an emergency rescue case.45 First, in each of the cited cases, the nature
of the employee's job specifically involved travel, and the accident occurred
while the employee was traveling during his normal working hours.46 There-
fore, the "in course of" aspect in these cases would be considered quite strong
and would warrant a finding that the risk was work-connected. This distinction
is illustrated by the Mississippi Supreme Court's statement in Big "2" Engine
Rebuilders v. Freeman47 that " '[w]hen [, for example, the] claimant is... a...
driver who is certain to encounter collisions along the highway, it is easy to see
40. 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
41. Id. at 508-09.
42. Id. at 506-07. According to Professor Larson, "It]he Brown-Pacific-Maxon case adopts the
positional risk theory in its purest form, by finding work-connection if the employment merely
brings the employee to the place where he encounters a moral obligation to rescue a stranger." 1 A.
LARSON, supra note 20, § 28.33, at 5-423.
43. Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at 131, 356 S.E.2d at 797.
44. Id. at 131, 356 S.E.2d at 798.
45. See Food Products Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ariz. 208, 208-09, 630 P.2d 31, 31-32
(1981); In re D'Angeli's Case, 369 Mass. 812, 813-15, 343 N.E.2d 368, 369-70 (1976); Big "2" En-
gine Rebuilders v. Freeman, 379 So. 2d 888, 889 (Miss. 1980).
46. See Food Products Corp., 129 Ariz. at 208-09, 630 P.2d at 31-32 (delivery truck driver, en
route to first delivery, injured while assisting a stranger); D'Angeli's Case, 369 Mass. at 813-15, 343
N.E.2d at 369-70 (1976) (mechanic, returning from routine work performed outside employer's
premises, injured while removing obstruction from highway); Big "2" Engine, 379 So. 2d at 889
(route salesman injured while assisting a motorist in apparent distress).
47. 379 So. 2d 888 (Miss. 1980).
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the connection between the work and the contact with the emergency.' ,,48 In
contrast, "Roberts' employment as a furniture designer did not require him to be
on the public highways on a regular basis," and therefore the connection be-
tween his job and the emergency he encountered was less foreseeable.49
A second distinction between Roberts and the cited state court cases is that
in the latter the employers were appealing awards of compensation, whereas in
Roberts the Industrial Commission had denied compensation. The awards of
compensation by the respective commissions in the cited cases are significant
because of the deference the courts were willing to give to the decisions of the
respective commissions. The reluctancy of the courts to reverse the commis-
sions' decisions was expressly acknowledged in two of the cited cases. For ex-
ample, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in In re D'Angeli's Case50 stated: "
'The decision of the board is to stand unless it is unsupported by the evidence, or
tainted by error of law. This is so even if a different finding could have been
made by the board.' "51 The court concluded it would sustain the general find-
ing of the reviewing board if possible. 52 The court in Big "2" Engine Rebuilders
also shared this view, stating that because that was "at least a 'doubtful case,'"
the court would affirm the award.5 3 Because of the deference those courts were
willing to give to the decisions of the respective commissions, these cases do not
provide sufficient support for the Roberts court's decision.
Although, for the reasons discussed above, the state court decisions cited in
Roberts do not support an award of compensation in that case, other state court
decisions do indicate that the decision in Roberts is valid. One such case is
Reilly v. Weber Engineering Co., 4 in which an employee was killed while at-
tempting to rescue a child who had become entangled in some electrical wires.
In supporting its award of compensation, the New Jersey Court quoted exten-
sively from the O'Leary opinion.5 5 One factor that distinguishes Reilly from
Roberts is that the employee in Reilly came into contact with the emergency
only because he had been instructed by the secretary in charge of his office to
investigate the cause of a commotion near the employer's premises. 5 6
A second case that supports the Roberts decision is Edwards v. Louisiana
Forestry Commission.57 The employee in Edwards, a fire towerman, was on duty
in his tower when he witnessed a dog attacking a child.5 8 The employee suffered
48. Id. at 892 (quoting I A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 28.22, at 5-421).
49. Brief for Appellee at 13, Roberts, 86 N.C. App. 126, 356 S.E.2d 794 (1987) (No.
8610IC1 160).
50. 369 Mass. 812, 343 N.E.2d 368 (1976).
51. Id. at 815, 343 N.E.2d at 370 (quoting Ritchie's Case, 351 Mass. 495, 496, 222 N.E.2d 687,
688 (1966)) (emphasis added).
52. Id. (quoting Demetre's Case, 322 Mass. 95, 98, 76 N.E.2d 140, 142 (1947)).
53. Big "2" Engine Builders, 379 So. 2d at 892.
54. 107 N.J. Super. 254, 258 A.2d 36 (1969).
55. Id. at 260-61, 258 A.2d at 40.
56. Id. at 260, 258 A.2d at 39.
57. 221 La. 818, 60 So. 2d 449 (1952).
58. Id. at 820, 60 So. 2d at 449.
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a hernia when he rushed down the tower stairway to rescue the child. 59 The
Louisiana Court of Appeals denied compensation on the basis that there was no
connection between the rescue effort and the employment, and no benefit to the
employer. 6° The Louisiana Supreme Court, citing the recently decided O'Leary
opinion, reversed the court of appeals and awarded compensation. 61 In addition
to relying on the O'Leary decision, the Edwards court analogized to cases al-
lowing recovery for injuries incurred during "horse play," stating that "empha-
sis is no longer placed on a particular act and its tendency to forward the
employer's work in determining whether an injury is compensable." 62 Although
Edwards was later set aside on procedural grounds, it apparently continues to
represent the Louisiana view on the emergency rescue issue.6 3 It is important to
note, however, that North Carolina and Louisiana have not been consistent in
their views concerning workers' compensation. Specifically, while Lousiana "pi-
oneered in the development of the positional risk doctrine," 64 North Carolina
courts, until Roberts and Felton, had continued to rely on the increased-risk and
employer-benefit tests.
Following its application of the positional-risk test, the Roberts court ap-
plied a second test, the increased-risk test, to support its decision that Roberts'
death arose out of his employment. As stated earlier, the increased-risk test has
frequently been used in North Carolina to address the "arising out of" require-
ment.65 In applying this test, the court in Roberts sought to distinguish the facts
surrounding Roberts' death from those of other cases in which the employees'
injuries were held not to have arisen out of their employment "because the
hazards [giving rise to the injuries] were ones to which the general public was
equally exposed."' 66 Examples of such public hazards include dog bites, armed
robberies, and choking to death. 67 In justifying its decision that the risk involved
in Roberts was an increased risk, the court stated that "Mr. Roberts' affirmative
act of humanitarianism was, by its selfless nature, not something generally done
by all."'68 Regardless of the accuracy of this statement, Roberts' employment
did not increase his selflessness. It is most likely that Roberts would have taken
the same actions regardless of his employment situation. In addition, the pres-
ence of two other men on the scene, also offering their assistance at the time
Roberts was killed indicates, happily, that this type of selfless behavior is not as
59. Id.
60. Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry Comm'n, 49 So. 2d 53, 55 (La. Ct. App. 1950), rev'd, 221
La. 818, 60 So. 2d 449 (1952).
61. Edwards, 221 La. at 839, 60 So. 2d at 456.
62. Id. at 824, 60 So. 2d at 451.
63. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 28.23, at 5-425 n.57 (Cum. Supp. Dec. 1987).
64. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 28.23, at 5-425 (Cum. Supp. Dec. 1987).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
66. Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at 135, 356 S.E.2d at 800.
67. Id. (citing Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (1977) (employee
killed by armed robber in parking lot); Bartlett v. Duke Univ., 284 N.C. 230, 200 S.E.2d 193 (1973)
(employee choked to death during dinner on business trip); Plemmons v. White's Serv., Inc., 213
N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370 (1938) (service station attendant died following dog bite)).
68. Id. at 136, 356 S.E.2d at 800.
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rare as the court suggested. Based on these factors, the court's characterization
of the risk in Roberts as an increased risk was unwarranted.
In addition to the application of the positional-risk and increased-risk tests,
the court in Roberts also supported its award of compensation on the basis of the
employer-benefit test.69 The court determined that Burlington Industries bene-
fited as a result of the goodwill generated by the various newspaper articles and a
trade paper article naming Roberts as an employee of Burlington Industries who
was killed while acting as a good Samaritan.70 Although the employer-benefit
test is well established in North Carolina, the facts of Roberts can be distin-
guished from other cases applying this test because the latter have involved some
degree of business connection between the injured party and the employer. One
such case is Guest v. Brenner Iron and Metal Co..71 In Guest the employee
stopped at a service station to use the station's air hose to fill the tires of his
employer's car.72 As the employee was inflating the tires, the car of a service
station customer stalled, and the service station operator requested the em-
ployee's assistance in pushing the disabled vehicle.73 The employee agreed to
help, and was subsequently injured when the car he was pushing was struck by a
third car. 7 4 Because the employee was using the service station's air hose to
inflate the tires of his employer's car at the time the request for assistance was
made, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the injury was compensable,
as the employee was rendering assistance in exchange for a benefit to his em-
ployer.75 The court explicitly stated, however, that its facts were "distinguish-
able from cases where the act of the employee, characterized as 'chivalric,' or 'an
errand of mercy,' or 'the act of a good Samaritan,' is wholly unrelated to the
employment."' 76 Because Roberts' acts fall within the stated exception, Guest is
not controlling.
Another North Carolina case illustrating the necessity for some business
relationship between the injured party and the employer in order for the em-
ployer-benefit test to apply is Lewis v. Kentucky Central Life Insurance Co. 77 In
Lewis the employee was a salesman who was injured in an attempt to aid a
69. Id. at 133, 356 S.E.2d 798-99.
70. Id. "Several local newspapers carried the story and noted that Mr. Roberts worked for
Burlington," and "[a] trade publication called 'Furniture Today' ran an article on Mr. Roberts call-
ing him a furniture designer for Burlington who died 'in the act of being a good Samaritan."' Id.
71. 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596 (1955).
72. Id. at 453, 48 S.E.2d at 600.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. "Guest v. BrennerIron & Metal Co., establishes squarely the proposition that if employ-
ees are receiving aid from a third person which is benefiting their employer, their reciprocating with
help to the third person is also a benefit to the employer." 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 27.22(a),
at 5-341.
76. Guest, 241 N.C. at 454-55, 85 S.E.2d at 601. The court in Roberts stated that although
Roberts' assistance was "undoubtedly the act of a very good Samaritan," his act was not "the kind of
unconditional assistance that the Court in Guest, supra, reasoned to be unrelated to the employ-
ment." Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at 133, 356 S.E.2d at 798. The court failed, however, to note any
specific distinguishing factors.
77. 20 N.C. App. 247, 251, 201 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1973).
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known customer with whom negotiations for new dealings were under way. 78
As stated by Professor Larson, "When the person assisted stands in some busi-
ness relation to the employer, the employer benefit is relatively obvious."' 79 Be-
cause Winters, the person assisted by Roberts, was a complete stranger, as well
as a transient who lacked even the money to pay for his dinner, it is clear that he
did not occupy a business relationship of any kind with respect to Burlington
Industries.
In addition to the absence of a business relationship between Winters and
Burlington Industries, Deputy Commissioner Shuping determined that any ben-
efit resulting to Burlington Industries was "too remote and immeasurable" to
satisfy the employer-benefit requirement.80 The court of appeals disagreed, stat-
ing that although the extent of the benefit to Burlington Industries was uncer-
tain, it was sufficient to support an award of coverage under the employer-
benefit test.81 The court's finding in this respect can be contrasted with that of
Food Products Co. v. Industrial Commission,8 2 one of the cases cited by the Rob-
erts court in support of its application of the positional-risk test. The employee
in Food Products argued that compensation should be awarded to him under
either the increased-risk test or the employer-benefit test.8 3 With respect to the
latter, the employee argued that "humanitarian acts by an employee benefit soci-
ety as a whole and could benefit the employer indirectly by increasing business
goodwill or by increasing the overall likelihood of rescue for the employer in the
future." 84 In rejecting this contention, the Food Products court quoted a previ-
ous case that observed "the presumed benefit [to the employer] may be stretched
so thin as to become fiction."18 5 Although Roberts presents a stronger case for a
finding of an employer benefit than Food Products, due to the various articles
written about Roberts, it is unlikely that such articles resulted in any real benefit
to Burlington Industries.
Even if the employer-benefit test indicated that compensation should be al-
lowed in Roberts, it is questionable whether the application of the test under
these facts would be equitable. In arriving at his decision in this case, the Dep-
uty Commissioner noted that "decedent's heroic act would have likely remained
one of [an] annonomyous [sic] stranger had he not been tragically killed."18 6
This observation raises the question whether it is fair to compensate an employee
who is killed in this situation, and not an employee who is "just" seriously in-
jured. Or, consider an employee who is killed in this same manner, but no news-
paper articles are written about the accident. It is somewhat disconcerting to
78. Id. at 248-49, 201 S.E.2d at 229-30.
79. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 27.22(a), at 5-35 (Cum. Supp. Dec. 1987).
80. Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at 133, 356 S.E.2d at 799.
81. Id.
82. 129 Ariz. 208, 630 P.2d 31 (1981).
83. Id. at 211, 630 P.2d at 34.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Hegwood v. Pittman, 471 P.2d 888, 891 (Okla. 1970)). The court stated that
any benefit received by the employer in that case was "tenuous at best." Id.




think that the degree of sensationalism of a particular tragedy could determine
whether workers' compensation benefits would be awarded.
Finally, in addition to the application of the three tests discussed above, the
court in Roberts stated that workmen's compensation benefits should be
awarded in this case on policy grounds.87 Specifically, the court stated that its
holding was "based on a sound policy that seeks to foster in employees acts of
humanitarianism such as those displayed by Mr. Roberts in his last few mo-
ments alive." s8 8 The court also stated that its holding would benefit employers
because it would encourage characteristics "that an employer no doubt looks for
when hiring employees to impress upon customers the quality of its work
force."8 9 Although one commentator, who would likely favor the result in Rob-
erts, stated "knowledge that financial assistance is available to one injured in
'attempting to aid another might induce this favorable action," 90 this possibility
is not sufficient to justify an award of compensation for an injury that the North
Carolina General Assembly did not intend the workers' compensation system to
bear. "It is well established in this State that the Workmen's Compensation Act
is not intended to provide general health and accident insurance ... "91 One
commentator has suggested that because these types of acts occur infrequently,
workers' compensation should be awarded as "the social desirability of Good
Samaritan acts far outweighs the increase in cost to the consumer."'92 Although
the costs may not be great, and it may be "socially desirable" to compensate
these types of injuries, these injuries were not meant to be compensated via the
workers' compensation system.
The crucial issue in the Roberts decision was whether Roberts' death arose
out of his employment. In addressing this issue, the court of appeals applied
three tests-the positional-risk test, the increased-risk test, and the employer-
benefit test-as well as a public policy argument. While the increased-risk and
employer-benefit tests are well established in North Carolina, these tests do not
support an award of compensation on the facts of Roberts. In contrast, although
the positional-risk test clearly does support an award of compensation in Rob-
erts, North Carolina courts generally have not employed this test. The adoption
of the positional-risk test marks a significant and arguably unwarranted change
in the degree of work-relatedness necessary to satisfy the "arising out of" re-
quirement. Finally, the court's public policy argument- that coverage should
be awarded in this case to encourage such humanitarian acts-is simply too
speculative to support its holding.
As stated in the dissenting opinion in O'Leary, to award workers' compen-
sation in this type of case is to find the employer liable simply because he is an
87. Roberts, 86 N.C. App. at 136, 356 S.E.2d at 800.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Comment, Workmen's Compensation: A Vehicle for Compensating the Good Samaritan, 24
BUFFALO L. REV. 857, 860 (1974-75).
91. Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 5 N.C. App. 37, 41, 167 S.E.2d 790, 792-93 (1969).
92. Comment, supra note 90, at 875.
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employer. 93 This result is something North Carolina courts, with the exception
of the Roberts court, will not sanction. Although Roberts was deserving of
much praise and admiration for his selfless acts, his dependents should not have
been awarded workers' compensation for his death.
ADDENDUM
Since this Note was written, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the court of appeals in Roberts on the basis that Roberts' death
did not arise out of his employment. 94 In reaching this result, the supreme court
relied on analyses consistent with those presented in this Note.
First, the supreme court rejected the argument that compensation should be
awarded under the employer-benefit test, stating that the court of appeals' find-
ing of an employer benefit from the newspaper and trade magazine articles was
"purely speculative." 95
Next, the supreme court held that compensation should not be awarded
under the increased-risk test because "[d]ecedent's employment did not increase
the risk that he would be struck by a car while shielding an injured stranger with
no relation to the employment." '96
Finally, the supreme court rejected the court of appeal's adoption of the
positional-risk test, stating that "we have said that the employment may provide
'a convenient opportunity' for the injury or death by accident without providing
the cause."' 97 The court concluded that "[t]o grant compensation [in this case]
would effectively remove the 'arising out of the employment' requirement from
the Act." 98
SUSAN YARBOROUGH Not
93. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 510 (1950) (Minton, J., dissenting).
94. Roberts v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 321 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d'417 (1988).
95. Id. at 355, 364 S.E.2d at 421. See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text for this Note's
analysis of the employer-benefit test.
96. Id. at 358, 364 S.E.2d at 423. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for this Note's
analysis of the increased-risk test.
97. Id. at 359, 364 S.E.2d at 423. See supra notes 33-64 and accompanying text for this Note's
analysis of the positional-risk test.
98. Id. at 360, 364 S.E.2d at 424.
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